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INTRODUCTION 
The briefs filed by appellees A.H. Palmer & Sons ("Palmer") 
and Interwest Construction ("Interwest") bring to mind an old 
trial lawyer's adage: If you can't dazzle the court, you can at 
least baffle it. Both briefs are founded upon evident 
misconstructions of controlling law and plain distortions of the 
record. Indeed, the level of legal and factual confusion generated 
is so high that an orderly (and comprehensible) reply is difficult. 
Thiokol Corporation, however, will attempt to penetrate the fog. 
Palmer and Interwest variously assert: (1) that Thiokol has 
not "marshalled" the evidence (Palmer Brief 20-23; Interwest Brief 
2 . . . 
6 ), (2) that the trial court either did not use — or quite 
properly invoked — negligence principles to absolve them of 
contractual liability (Pal. Br. 7-8, 23-29; Int. Br. 6-8), (3) that 
Thiokol has waived (or modified) its contractual rights (Pal. Br. 
34-39, Int. Br. 8-13), (4) that Thiokol's deficient plans and 
supervision absolve them of contractual liability (Pal. Br. 40-44), 
(5) that Thiokol's tort theories are inappropriate (Pal. Br. 29-34, 
Int. Br. 15-19), and (6) that implied warranty and strict liability 
theories do not apply to the case (Pal. Br. 44-47, Int. Br. 13-15). 
Thiokol will respond to these contentions, although not in the 
order presented by appellees. 
John Rysgaard, dba Fiberglass Structures Company and 
Fiberglass Structures Company, Inc., ("Rysgaard," or "the tank 
manufacturer") has not filed a brief or otherwise refuted any of 
the arguments made in Thiokol's Opening Brief (hereinafter 
"Thiokol Br."). 
2 
Hereinafter cited as "Pal. Br." and "Int. Br." 
1 
Despite Palmer's and Interwest's histrionics about 
"marshalling the evidence," this is not a case that turns upon how 
the Court construes the record. Thiokol's opening brief carefully 
(and as dispassionately as possible) presented all of the arguments 
(and evidence) presented by Palmer and Interwest in support of 
their claims. See Thiokol Br. 2-13, 15-19. Indeed, any additional 
"evidence" cited by appellees in their briefs either does not add 
to Thiokol's summary of the evidence or (even worse) distorts the 
record. Thiokol, moreover, has not asked this Court to discard 
4 
the trial court's factual findings. This case, in short, 
presents legal issues regarding contract construction, not factual 
disputes. Kimball v. Campbell. 699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 1985). 
Because the appellees' "factual" contentions haye been raised 
in a studied attempt to deflect attention from clear legal error, 
Thiokol will respond to factual arguments last and concentrate, 
initially, on the questions of law presented. Contrary to 
appellees' submissions, the trial court did apply negligence 
principles to this contract case, a result that is simply 
unsupported by any authority. Thiokol, furthermore, did not waive 
or modify its contractual rights. Thiokol's tort, warranty, and 
Virtually all of the "Factual support for Findings of 
the Court" presented on pages 8-20 of Palmer's brief is 
summarized on pages 2-13 and 15-19 of Thiokol's opening brief. 
Indeed, as discussed in Section VI below, the only real 
"additions" contained in Palmer's brief are outright factual 
distortions. See, e.g., Pal. Br. 19 (asserting that Thiokol's 
expert "stated that the failure was not inconsistent with upward 
pressure") (citing Tr. 357-58). The transcript, however, reveals 
that the expert testimony was precisely to the contrary. See 
infra Addendum J[ 3. 
4
 See Thiokol Br. 29-30 & n.24. 
2 
strict liability theories, moreover, are well-founded and were 
improperly disregarded by the trial court. 
I. THE TRIAL COURT'S INVOCATION OF COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE IN 
A BREACH OF CONTRACT CASE IS UNSOUND AND UNPRECEDENTED 
Palmer and Interwest argue that the trial court either did not 
use negligence principles (Pal. Br. 7-8) or, alternatively, that 
"contract defense principles similar to tort defenses" were 
properly invoked. Id. at 23; Int. Br. 6-8. These contentions are 
unfounded. Even cursory perusal of the Memorandum Decision (App. A 
to Thiokol!s Brief) and the appellees1 briefs demonstrates that 
"[t]his . . . contract case" (Pal. Br. 2) was decided on 
comparative negligence grounds — a result totally unsupported in 
theory or precedent. 
The trial court's supposed "contract" analysis proceeded along 
the following lines: (1) the standards of NBS PS15-69 and the 
industry-wide safety factor of 10 were not incorporated into the 
contract (App. A at 2, 6), (2) Thiokol did not show the "cause" of 
the tank failure (App. A at 2, 4-5), and (3) the ultimate rupture 
of T33 was Thiokol1s responsibility because the company "should 
have been aware of" the tank's defects (App. A at 6). While the 
first step in this reasoning does turn on contract principles, the 
trial court plainly misapplied the controlling law. Thiokol Br. 
27-28. The second and third steps of the court's analysis, 
A document is incorporated into a contract so long as 
the reference is clear and called to the attention of the 
contracting parties. Thiokol Br. 17 (citing extensive 
authority). Val Palmer (Tr. 1787) and the tank manufacturer (Tr. 
1923, 1975) admitted that Thiokol's contract referenced NBS PS15-
69. Indeed, they expressly reassured Thiokol that the 
"Structural Layer" of the tanks would be fabricated "as per NBS 
3 
however, are grounded — not in contract — but in tort. 
"Causation" — the second step in the trial court's 
"contractual" inquiry — is an element of a negligence, not breach 
of contract, action. See Williams v. Melbv, 699 P.2d 723, 726 
(Utah 1985) (listing the elements of a negligence action as duty, 
breach, "causation of injury," and damages). A contract action, by 
contrast, is complete upon showing of a contract, breach and 
damages. E.g., John Edward Murray, Jr., Murray on Contracts § 117 
at 673 (1990) ("Any breach of contract, total or partial, provides 
the aggrieved party with a right to bring an action for 
damages"). The existence of a contract here is undisputed, and 
the appellees have conceded "that there was a breach of the 
PS 15.69." App. J. fl 3 (emphasis added). Industry standards, 
moreover, are incorporated into a contract "[ujnless otherwise 
agreed." Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 222(3); Rex T. 
Fuhriman, Inc. v. Jarrell, 445 P.2d 136 (Utah 1968). Every 
expert who testified at trial — including those hired by Palmer 
and Interwest — agreed that a 10-to-l safety factor is an 
industry standard. Tr. 1602, 1890 (testimony by Palmer experts). 
Therefore, the trial court's conclusion that NBS PS 15-69 and a 
safety factor of 10 were not "incorporated with sufficient 
clarity for the designer to be aware of their application" (App. 
A at 6) is erroneous as a matter of law. 
Even if "causation" were somehow relevant to breach of 
contract, the lower court's legal conclusion that Thiokol had not 
established that element is erroneous. The undisputed testimony 
was that, if the tanks had been built to a safety factor of three 
(let alone the factor of ten required by industry standards), the 
"overfilling" found by the trial court would not have resulted in 
the rupture of tank T33. See Thiokol Br. 31-32 (citing Tr. 2132-
34); cf. Pal. Br. 13 (misconstruing the testimony at Tr. 2132-
33). Palmer asserts that Thiokol's expert, on those pages, 
"could not account for the failure." Pal. Br. 13. In fact, the 
testimony cited by Palmer is that, if (as Palmer asserts) the 
tanks had been built to a safety factor of three, overfilling 
could not have caused the rupture because overfilling would only 
take "100th of the safety factor." Tr. 2133 (emphasis added). 
The tanks, in short, did not even have a safety factor of three. 
See infra Addendum f 2. 
4 
contract, a technical breach, by virtue of the fact that defective 
tanks were supplied." Tr. 2321 (Interwest's closing argument); 
accord App. A at 6 (Memorandum Decision) (the "tanks were under-
designed," and "did not have sufficient hoop or tensile strength 
and likely may have eventually failed in any regard"). 
Because the contract and its breach were conceded by appellees 
and acknowledged by the trial court, why did the court refuse to 
award damages? Because the court relied upon negligence principles 
in step three of its analysis to absolve the appellees: Thiokol 
"should have been aware of the need for higher standards as applied 
to both wall thickness, woven roving overlapping and safety 
factors." App. A at 6. Thus, even though Thiokol1s contractors 
supplied tanks with insufficient wall thickness, substandard 
overlapping of woven roving, and an "almost immaterial" safety 
factor (Tr. 602), Thiokol was negligent in not detecting such 
derelictions and, therefore, must bear any losses resulting from 
the failure of T3 3. 
That comparative fault is the basis for the trial court's 
"contractual" decision is also demonstrated by opposing counsels' 
closing arguments at trial (Tr. 2322)7 and their appellate briefs. 
Interwest's brief (at 7) forthrightly asserts that "Thiokol's 
relative knowledge, expertise, and opportunities to prevent the 
damages at issue in this litigation give rise to significant 
comparative fault issues." Palmer, for its part, while never 
Tr. 2322 (Interwest's counsel argues that Thiokol 
should be precluded "to the extent that we can prove they were 
actionably negligent"). 
5 
conceding that comparative negligence lies at the root of the trial 
o 
court's decision, nevertheless expends significant effort arguing 
Thiokol's fault. E.g.. Pal. Br. 11-12, 15-20, 40-44. 
But, notwithstanding opposing counsels' novel (and at times 
incomprehensible, e.g., Pal. Br. 23-26) arguments, the trial 
court's application of comparative fault to a contract case is 
theoretically unsound and absolutely unprecedented. It is 
theoretically unsound because it denies Thiokol the right to secure 
"legally enforceable promises" (Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
§ 344 cmt. a) any time Thiokol's "relative knowledge [or] 
expertise" (Int. Br. 7) is greater than that of the promisor. 
Thiokol Br. 24-26. Appellees have been excused from breach 
because, notwithstanding their shoddy performance, Thiokol should 
9 
have prevented or halted their defaults. No court — to 
Thiokol's knowledge — has ever seriously entertained such reasoning. 
Cf. Pal. Br. 7-8 (asserting that the trial court did 
not rely upon negligence principles). 
See Pal. Br. 42-44 (arguing that, "because Thiokol 
created the plans and specifications and closely supervised all 
work, especially the fix, the parties are absolved of 
responsibility"). According to Interwest, Thiokol may not 
recover because it "was more involved in the manufacture of the 
product at issue here than any of the parties it is seeking to 
recover from." Int. Br. 17 (emphasis deleted). Poor, unhappy 
Thiokol! If Palmer and Interwest are right, it may not "draft a 
reasonable contract and thereafter assume performance . . . in 
the ordinary course." Thiokol Br. 25. 
10 
E.g., Jackson State Bank v. King, 844 P.2d 1093, 1096 
(Wyo. 1993) ("because [the attorney/client relationship] is 
contractual in nature and is to be treated according to the law 
of contracts, there is no justification to invoke the comparative 
negligence statute"); Rediske v. Minnesota Valley Breeder's 
Ass'n, 374 N.W.2d 745, 749 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (refusing to 
apply Minnesota comparative fault statute to contract action); 
Fortier v. Dona Anna Plaza Partners, 747 F.2d 1324, 1337 (10th 
6 
Nor have counsel for Palmer or Interwest cited any authority 
for application of comparative negligence principles to contractual 
breach. On the contrary, Interwest (perhaps inadvertently?) has 
cited authority fatal to the appellees' position. As support for 
the proposition that comparative negligence principles are 
applicable, Interwest cites H. Woods, Comparative Fault § 14.17 (2d 
ed. 1987). That treatise, however, explains that "•[contributory 
negligence has never been an available defense in cases involving 
express warranties1" because "express warranty is clearly a 
contract action to which negligence has no relationship." Id. 
(emphasis added). 
The remaining "authority" cited by appellees similarly 
undercuts their position. Palmer and Interwest both cite Jacobsen 
Construction Co. v. Structo-Lite Engineering Co., 619 P.2d 306 
(Utah 1980) , for the proposition that "tort defenses, such as the 
former assumption of risk [a comparative fault principle ], apply 
in contract." Pal. Br. 23; Int. Br. 7-8. Jacobsen, however, did 
Cir. 1984) ("contributory negligence has no place in contract and 
fraud actions"); Haysville U.S.D. No. 261 v. GAF Corp., 666 P.2d 
192, 199 (Kan. 1983) ("The use of comparative negligence theory 
is not proper in breach of contract actions"); Broce-O'Dell 
Concrete Prods., Inc. v. Mel Jarvis Constr. Co., 634 P.2d 1142, 
1145 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981) ("It is well settled that contributory 
negligence is no defense to a breach of contract"); Rotman v. 
Hirsch, 199 N.W.2d 53, 56 (Iowa 1972) ("contributory negligence 
would not be available as a defense to an action on contract"); 
Fresno Air Serv. v. Wood, 43 Cal. Rptr. 276, 279 (Dist. Ct. App. 
1965) ("Assumption of risk and contributory negligence appear to 
fall within the general field of trespass and negligence . . . 
and hence are not applicable as theories of law and defenses to 
actions . . . for breach of contract"); see also Lee v. Andrews, 
667 P.2d 919, 921 (Mont. 1983) (finding use of "comparative 
negligence principles" in a contract case erroneous). 
11 
Meese v. Brigham Young Univ., 639 P.2d 720, 726 (Utah 
1981) ("assumption of the risk" is merely one aspect of 
comparative negligence) (Pal. Br. 25-26). 
not hold that assumption of the risk (or other comparative fault 
principles) are applicable to contract actions. Quite the 
opposite: it unequivocally rejected that notion. As the court 
explained: 
For purposes of analysis, assumption of risk is often 
divided into three categories. Those courts which 
attempt to deal with the various concepts subsumed under 
the one label refrain from considering one form, that is, 
the "express" form of assumption of risk. . . . An 
express assumption of risk involves a contractual 
provision in which a party expressly contracts not to sue 
for injury or loss which may thereafter be occasioned by 
the acts of another. We not only follow suit by 
refraining to include this form of assumption of risk in 
our discussion, but furthermore fail to see a necessity 
for including this form within assumption of risk 
terminology. As stated in James, Assumption of Risk, 61 
Yale L.J. 141 (1952), the field of contract law is more 
than adequate to deal with this bar to recovery. 
619 P.2d at 310 (emphasis added; citations omitted). Thus, 
Jacobsen actually stands for the proposition that contractual 
undertakings are unrelated to tort, and that it is unnecessary — 
12 
and unwise — to import "tort" into "contract." 
Vernon v. Lake Motors, 488 P.2d 302 (Utah 1971), furthermore, 
does not support Palmer's assertion that contributory negligence is 
a defense "in contract." Pal. Br. 25. Vernon merely holds that 
assumption of the risk, in limited circumstances, is a valid 
defense in certain warranty cases. 488 P.2d at 304-05 
Because the Jacobsen court expressly excluded contracts 
from comparative fault analysis, Palmer's citation of Moore v. 
Burton Lumber & Hardware Co., 631 P.2d 865, 869-70 (Utah 1981), 
is unavailing. Moore is cited (Pal. Br. 24) for the proposition 
that assumption of risk may "involve[] an express agreement by 
the plaintiff to accept the risk of danger." 631 P.2d at 869-70. 
This contractual "assumption of the risk," of course, is 
precisely the concept excluded from tort theory by Jacobsen, 619 
P.2d at 310 (the "field of contract law is more than adequate to 
deal with this bar to recovery"). 
8 
("deliberately and unreasonably proceeding to encounter a known 
risk" may reduce warranty recovery); see also H. Woods, Comparative 
Fault § 14.17 (2d ed. 1987). A "warranty" action, however, is not 
a "contract" action. As explained in Thiokol's opening brief (at 
26-27 & n.17), warranty had its inception in and retains the 
characteristics of a tort action. Contributory negligence, 
therefore, remains "a good [warranty] defense." Nelson v. 
Anderson, 72 N.W.2d 861, 865 (Minn. 1955).13 
The trial court, despite Palmer's current protestations (Pal. 
Br. 7-8), quite clearly accepted the appellees' invitation to 
release them from contractual liability "to the extent that we can 
prove [Thiokol was] actionably negligent." Tr. 2322. This result 
completely undoes the theoretical underpinnings of contract law 
(i.e.. the enforcement of mutually bargained promises, see supra 
note 10) and is absolutely unsupported by precedent. The decision 
of the trial court must be reversed and the case remanded for 
14 
calculation of Thiokol's damages. 
Thiokol's warranty claims are not barred because the 
company did not "know of the defect and the danger, but 
nevertheless 'deliberately and unreasonably' go[] ahead." 
Vernon. 488 P.2d at 305; see Thiokol Br. 38-39. On the contrary, 
Thiokol had been consistently assured that the repaired tanks 
were safe. E.g., Thiokol Br. 9-10; App. O f 2 (express warranty 
guaranteeing the "structural integrity of [the repaired] tanks 
for a period of three years against structural failure"). 
14
 Palmer's citation (Pal. Br. 26) of the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts § 344 to support "comparative fault" 
contracts verges on the ludicrous. That section provides that 
Thiokol is entitled to either its "expectation interest" (i.e., 
the benefit of its bargain), or its "reliance interest" (i.e., 
the costs it incurred relying on the contract). Thiokol has been 
denied recovery of either interest. Thiokol did not (as Palmer 
cynically asserts) "expect" — much less "rely upon" — the 
appellees' delivery of "an inferior product which [would] someday 
9 
II. THIOKOL DID NOT WAIVE OR MODIFY ITS CONTRACT RIGHTS 
Interwoven throughout the trial court's decision and the 
appellees' briefs are assertions that Thiokol either "waived" (App. 
A at 6; Pal. Br. 26-29; Int. Br. 8-13) or "modified" (App. A at 7; 
Pal. Br. 34-39) its contract rights by accepting the repair of the 
tanks. Although Palmer (Pal. Br. 35) and Interwest (Int. Br. 9) 
both concede that — at the time of the first tank failure — 
Thiokol could have declared breach and required replacement of the 
tanks, they nevertheless assert that Thiokol "waived" or "modified" 
its rights by accepting, instead, the appellees' proffered repair. 
These arguments are insupportable. 
Thiokol (with one exception) does not dispute the law of 
"waiver" and "modification" cited by appellees. The Utah Supreme 
Court "has consistently defined waiver as 'the intentional 
relinquishment of a known right.'" Soter's. Inc. v. Deseret Fed. 
Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 857 P.2d 935, 939-40 (Utah 1993) (quoting Rees 
v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 808 P.2d 1069, 1073 (Utah 
1991)).15 Parties to a contract, moreover, "may, by mutual 
consent, modify any or all" of their contractual obligations. Ted 
R. Brown & Assocs., Inc. v. Carnes Corp., 753 P.2d 964, 968 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988) (emphasis added). To establish a modification, 
fail." Pal. Br. 26. 
15
 Accord Anderson v. Brinkerhoff. 756 P.2d 95, 98 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988) ("Waiver is defined as the voluntary and 
intentional relinquishment of a known right"); Epperson v. 
Roloff, 719 P.2d 799, 804 (Nev. 1986) (defining waiver as "an 
intentional relinquishment of a known right") (quoting J. 
Calamari & J. Perillo, The Law of Contracts § 11-34, at 446 (2d 
ed. 1977)); Vessels Oil & Gas Co. v. Coastal Ref. & Mkta.. Inc., 
764 P.2d 391, 392 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988) (same). 
10 
"[h]owever, the minds of the parties must have met." Provo City 
Corp. v. Nielson Scott Co.. 603 P.2d 803, 806 (Utah 1979). And, 
evidence showing this meeting of the minds — contrary to Palmer's 
unsupported fiat (at 39) — must be "clear and convincing, and of 
the most positive character." 17A C.J.S. Contracts § 588 
(1963).16 Furthermore, the contract here expressly provides that 
"this contract may not be altered, amended or modified except in 
writing, signed by duly authorized representatives of both 
parties." App. D to Thiokol's Opening Brief at f 4. 
17 
The appellees1 arguments (adopted by the trial court) fall 
decidedly short of establishing either "waiver" or "modification." 
There is no "clear and convincing" evidence (see supra note 16), 
nor is there any "writing, signed by duly authorized 
representatives," supporting either theory. App. D, f 4. Indeed, 
Interwest candidly concedes that "there is no evidence that Thiokol 
expressly relinquished its rights as against Interwest either at 
[the time of the repair of the tanks] or [at] any other time." 
Int. Br. 11. Palmer and Interwest, however, assert that an intent 
to waive or modify can be "inferred" from Thiokol's actions. Id. 
Accord Mathis v. Thunderbird Village, Inc., 389 P.2d 
343, 349 (Or. 1964) (although parties, by subsequent actions, may 
modify contract, "[l]ike other nonwritten contractual 
modifications, the evidence of the modification must be clear and 
convincing"); Grizzly Bar, Inc. v. Hartman, 454 P.2d 788, 791 
(Colo. 1969) ("Modification of a written agreement must be 
demonstrated by clear and satisfactory evidence. . . . It cannot 
be effected by the sole action of one of the parties. Consent of 
both is necessary. The same meeting of minds is needed as was 
necessary to make the contract in the first instance."). 
App. A at 7 (finding "waiver" and/or "modification" for 
the reasons "argued by Palmer"). 
11 
The trial court (based upon Palmer's arguments, App. A at 7) 
"inferred" waiver and/or modification from the following: 
(1) Thiokol "opted to approve the fix and accept the tanks" (Pal. 
Br. 35-36; App. A at 7); (2) Thiokol used its "independent expert 
Dr. Thomas to verify the fix" (Pal. Br. 35; App. A at 7); 
(3) Thiokol negotiated with the tank manufacturer regarding the 
"fix," leaving "Interwest and Palmer out of the loop" (Pal. Br. 35; 
App. A at 3, 7); and (4) Thiokol sought an extended warranty 
directly from the manufacturer (Pal. Br. 36; App. A at 3). Accord 
Int. Br. 10-13. These actions, however, do not — as a matter of 
law — amount to "waiver" or "modification" of the original 
contract. 
To begin with, even granting that Thiokol independently sought 
to verify the soundness of the "fix," directly negotiated with the 
tank manufacturer, sought an extended warranty covering the "fix," 
and left Palmer and Interwest "out of the loop" (a position at odds 
18 
with uncontradicted record evidence), these actions simply do 
not "waive" or "modify" Thiokol's rights. Indeed, Palmer and 
Interwest, concede that "the tanks were to be within specifications 
after the fix" (Pal. Br. 36, citing Finding of Fact 23). The 
"fix," in short, according to the express assurances made to 
Thiokol (e.g., Exh. 13), would not "waive" or "modify" the contract 
but, on the contrary, was intended to bring the tanks into 
18 
Palmer's and Interwest's "out of the loop" arguments 
ignore uncontradicted evidence that they urged Thiokol to accept 
the repair. See Tr. 1551, 1556 (testimony by Palmer's foreman 
regarding the "prodding" it took to get Thiokol to accept the 
"fix," and Palmer's "delight" when the "fix" was accepted). See 
also Thiokol Br. 43-44 & App. P. 
12 
conformity with the terms of the original contract. 
Thus, Thiokol's attempts to verify the soundness of the 
"fix" — as well as its discussions with the tank manufacturer and 
its procurement of an express warranty covering the repaired tanks 
— plainly do not show that Thiokol "has intentionally relinquished 
a known right, either expressly or by conduct inconsistent with an 
intent to enforce that right." Lone Mountain Production Co. v. 
Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 710 F. Supp. 305, 311 (D. Utah 1989) 
(discussing the Utah law of waiver), aff'd. 984 F.2d 1551 (10th 
Cir. 1992). Nor do such actions demonstrate that "the minds of the 
parties . . . have met upon an asserted contract modification." 
Provo City Corp. v. Neilson Scott Co., 603 P.2d 803, 806 (Utah 
1979). On the contrary, Thiokol's actions demonstrate its 
continuing efforts to insure that — as required by the original 
contract — the "structural laminate sequence" of the tanks would 
be built according to "the 'applicable1 sections of . . . NBS-PS-
15-69." Exh. 13 at 2 (tank manufacturer's final written 
communication, reassuring Thiokol regarding the soundness of the 
20 
proposed "fix"). 
Because Thiokol's actions in negotiating the "fix" do not 
evidence any intent to depart from the terms of the original 
E.g., Exh. 13 (tank manufacturer's written assurance 
that the repair would brings the tanks into conformity with "the 
•applicable1 sections of . . . NBS-PS-15-19") (emphasis added). 
20 
And, although Palmer quibbles with Thiokol's original 
contract terms (Pal. Br. 40-42), it cannot escape the fact that 
its own expert witnesses testified that, given identical 
specifications, they could have "designed perfectly serviceable 
tanks" (Tr. 1898) that would not have failed. Tr. 1647. 
13 
contract, the present "waiver" and "modification" arguments 
necessarily boil down to the simple assertion that Thiokol lost its 
rights because it "opted to approve the fix and accept the tanks." 
Pal. Br. 35-36; accord App. A at 7. The law, however, must 
encourage — not penalize — parties who attempt to resolve 
21 
contractual disputes by private agreement. If the trial court 
and appellees are correct, Utah law demands immediate litigation 
rather than conciliatory negotiation. Cf. Int. Br. 9 (chastising 
Thiokol for negotiating a "fix" rather than exercising its 
"existing right" of immediate suit); Pal. Br. 35-36 (same). 
The result reached below is contrary to sound policy. Indeed, 
the very authority appellees cite demonstrates the absurdity of 
their "waiver" and "modification" arguments. In Vessels Oil & Gas 
Co. v. Coastal Refining & Marketing, Inc., 764 P.2d 391 (Colo. Ct. 
App. 1988) (cited at Int. Br. 9), Vessels brought a breach of 
contract action in Colorado against Coastal. Although the contract 
contained a forum selection clause requiring litigation in Texas, 
Coastal did not invoke the clause and, instead, conducted 
settlement negotiations. After settlement talks failed, however, 
Coastal invoked the forum selection clause. Vessels — like the 
appellees here — argued that, by engaging in settlement 
discussions, Coastal had "waived" the Texas forum. 
The Colorado Court of Appeals resoundingly rejected the waiver 
argument. After noting that "waiver is the intentional 
relinquishment of a known right," the Colorado court concluded that 
Thiokol Br. 42. 
14 
two months of settlement negotiations did not result in waiver 
precisely because "good faith settlement negotiations" are "a 
practice to be encouraged, not penalized." 764 P.2d at 392. 
Likewise, the amicable resolution of contractual disputes — by the 
cure of defective performances — is "a practice to be encouraged, 
22 
not penalized." 
III. THIOKOL'S NON-CONTRACTUAL THEORIES WERE IMPROPERLY 
DISREGARDED BY THE TRIAL COURT 
Appellees assert that they are not liable in tort (Pal. Br. 
29-33; Int. Br. 15-19), that the UCC is inapplicable (Pal. Br. 46-
47; Int. Br. 13-15), and that strict liability theory is 
unavailable to Thiokol (Pal. Br. 44-46; Int. Br. 17-18). These 
submissions are flatly contrary to controlling law. 
A. Palmer and Interwest Are Liable in Tort 
The trial court, based upon arguments presented by Palmer, 
held tort law inapplicable here. App. A at 6-7. Palmer relied 
upon East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 
U.S. 858 (1986), to support this position before the trial court. 
In tacit recognition that its East River arguments are unfounded 
(see Thiokol Br. 4 5-4 6), Palmer now avoids any reference to that 
case and retreats, instead, to Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 
Accord Kostelac v. United States, 247 F.2d 723, 729-30 
(9th Cir. 1957) (attempted contractual "cure" does not result in 
"waiver" of right to rescind because "the law ought to encourage 
the parties to reach amicable settlements of [contractual] 
disputes"); Chaplin v. Bessire & Co., 361 S.W.2d 293, 297 (Ky. 
1962) (same); Thiokol Br. 41-42; see also Phoenix Ins. Co. v. 
Heath, 61 P.2d 308, 311-12 (Utah 1936) (cited in Int. Br. 10) (an 
insurer's request that its agents comply with orders is not a 
"waiver"; the request does not "indicate a waiver or 
relinquishment" of the insurer's contractual rights). 
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701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985). Beck, however, accords Palmer no surer 
legal footing than East River. 
In Beck, the Utah Supreme Court did not hold that "if parties 
arrange rights, duties and obligations under a contract, their 
cause of action for breach of those obligations is in contract and 
not in tort." Pal. Br. 29. Rather, the Supreme Court merely 
refused to recognize — in the context of the first-party 
relationship between an insurer and its insured — the tort of bad-
faith refusal to settle. 701 P.2d at 798.23 The Supreme Court's 
limited conclusion in Beck — i.e., that bad faith claims between 
an insurer and its insured are covered by the duty of good faith 
and fair dealing (701 P.2d at 799-80) — quite clearly does not 
establish, as a general matter, that a contract precludes all tort 
claims between contracting parties. 
Indeed, in Culp Construction Co. v. Buildmart Mall, 795 P.2d 
650 (Utah 1990), also cited by Palmer (at 30-31), the Supreme Court 
clarified that Beck does not "preclude the bringing of a tort claim 
independently of a contract claim." 795 P.2d at 654. In Culp, the 
court held that a claim for negligent misrepresentation (arising 
out of the issuance of a contract of title insurance) could be 
brought concurrently with a contract claim because "'the acts 
constituting a breach of contract may also result in breaches of 
duty that are independent of the contract and may give rise to 
Specifically, the court concluded that "the good faith 
duty to bargain or settle under an insurance contract is only one 
aspect of the duty of good faith and fair dealing implied in all 
contracts and . . . a violation of that duty gives rise to a 
claim for breach of contract." 701 P.2d at 798. 
16 
causes of action in tort.111 795 P.2d at 654 (quoting Beck, 701 
P.2d at 800 n.3). 
The Utah Supreme Court, moreover, has unequivocally held that 
11
 [a] party who breaches his duty of due care toward another may be 
found liable to the other in tort, even where the relationship 
giving rise to such a duty originates in a contract between the 
parties." DCR Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co.. 663 P.2d 433, 435 (Utah 
24 . . . . . . 
1983) . Accordingly, in line with the "majority of 
jurisdictions," the Utah Supreme Court "recognized a duty to 
exercise reasonable care on the part of one who undertakes to 
render services." 663 P.2d at 436. 
The tort-based duty to exercise reasonable care unambiguously 
extends to contractors in the position of Palmer and Interwest. 
They were under a duty to perform "in accordance with the plans 
specifications, and directions given [them] by [Thiokol] with a 
reasonable degree of skill," or "that degree of skill and care 
ordinarily possessed and exercised by other contractors doing the 
same or similar work in this locality." Andrus v. State, 541 P.2d 
1117, 1121 (Utah 1975) (citing Marin Mun. Water Dist. v. Peninsula 
Paving Co., 94 P.2d 404, 406 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1939)). As a 
result, they are liable for all damages flowing from their breach 
The DCR court emphasized that the fact a party is 
"•acting . . . under a contract'" does not relieve that party 
from tort liability because "'the two duties are distinct.1" Id. 
at 436 (quoting Flint & Walling Mfg. Co. v. Beckett, 79 N.E. 503, 
505-06 (Ind. 1906)). 
17 
of that duty. The trial court's refusal to consider Thiokol's 
tort claims constitutes error and requires reversal. 
Palmer's and Interwest's tort liability, finally, is not 
solely derivative, as Interwest claims. Int. Br. 15. As noted in 
Thiokol's Brief (at 48 n.41), neither Palmer (Tr. 1473, 1791-92) 
nor Interwest (Tr. 1258-59) investigated the tank manufacturer's 
experience — despite their express contractual obligation to do 
27 . . . 
so. Such an investigation would have revealed the manufacturer's 
In Marin, 94 P.2d at 406, the court held that "[w]here 
a contractor departs" from contract specifications "which results 
in injury to adjacent property, then he is responsible in damages 
for the tort he has committed." 
26 
Palmer's citation of Paul Mueller Co. v. Cache Valley 
Dairy Ass'n. 657 P.2d 1279 (Utah 1982), to support its claimed 
exemption from tort liability (Pal. Br. 33-34) is inapposite and, 
in a very real sense, ironic. That case, unlike the present 
situation, did not involve a contractor's tort liability for 
injuries to person or property flowing from the contractor's 
failure to conform to contract specifications. Rather, Paul 
Mueller merely involved a contractor's possible liability for 
"economic loss"; i.e.. "loss attributable to nondangerous defects 
in the product." 657 P.2d at 1286. Thus, the case simply has no 
bearing where (as here) a contractor's shoddy performance results 
in danger to person or property. Cf. DCR Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co., 
663 P.2d 433 (Utah 1983) (post-Paul Mueller case imposing "a duty 
to exercise reasonable care" in the rendering of services). 
Moreover, the Paul Mueller court concluded that an owner who had 
contracted to purchase the defective product did not need to 
invoke tort theory because the owner's contractor — who had 
actually procured the defective product — "bore responsibility 
for correction of such defects." 657 P.2d at 1286. The 
reasoning of Paul Mueller, in short, would not absolve Palmer, 
but instead would impose upon Palmer — who contracted with 
Rysgaard to provide the defective tanks — the "responsibility 
for correction of [the tanks'] defects." Id. 
27 
The contract required the manufacturer to be a company 
"whose products have been used satisfactorily in similar services 
for at least 2 years prior to the issue date of the Contract." 
App. H f 1.0.3.A. 
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unsuitability. Because Palmer's and Interwest's "failure to 
exercise reasonable care" in the selection of the tank manufacturer 
clearly "increase[d] the risk of [physical] harm" to Thiokol, they 
are liable in tort. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323 (adopted 
in DCR Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co., 663 P.2d at 436). 
B. UCC Implied Warranties Are Applicable to This Case 
Palmer and Interwest assert that the UCC is not applicable 
because the contract was not for the sale of "goods" (Pal. Br. 47, 
Int. Br. 13-14) and they are not "merchants" (Pal. Br. 46, Int. Br. 
13-14). The contrary is true. 
Palmer asserts that the contract was not for the sale of 
"goods" because the installed tanks are not personal property. 
Pal. Br. 47. This argument simply ignores the statutory definition 
of "goods." Thiokol Br. 36 (the tanks are "goods" because they 
were "movable" at the time they were "identified" to the contract; 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 70A-2-105(1), 70A-2-501(l)(b)). 
Interwest, recognizing the frailty of the above argument, 
submits that — even if the tanks are "goods" — Thiokol contracted 
primarily for the purchase of "services." Int. Br. 13-14 (citing 
Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Electro Flo Corp., 451 F.2d 1115 (10th Cir. 
1971). However, even if Thiokol's contracts are viewed as 
involving both "services" and "goods," the UCC controls. The test 
for classifying such contracts is whether the contract's 
predominant factor "is the rendition of service, with goods 
incidentally involved (e.g., contract with artist for painting) or 
28 
The manufacturer selected by Palmer and Interwest had 
built no tanks since 1970. Tr. 1967. 
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is a transaction of sale, with labor incidentally involved (e.g.. 
installation of a water heater in a bathroom)." Bonebrake v. Cox, 
499 F.2d 951, 960 (8th Cir. 1974) (footnotes omitted); accord 
Aluminum Co. of Am.f 451 F.2d at 1115 (applying Utah law). 
The predominant purpose of Thiokol's contracts with Palmer and 
Interwest was the acquisition of a waste water treatment plant, 
with the required labor only incidentally involved. Accord Omaha 
Pollution Control Corp. v. Carver-Greenfield Corp., 413 F. Supp. 
1069, 1085 (D. Neb. 1976) (dispute involving the design, 
construction and installation of a sewage treatment plant is best 
resolved "by treating it as a sale of goods under the [UCC]. It is 
clear that courts are turning to the Uniform Commercial Code to 
resolve the problems of transactions of this type.") (citations 
omitted); St. Anne-Nackawic Pulp Co. v. Research-Cottrell, Inc., 
788 F. Supp. 729, 734 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (contract for construction of 
air pollution control device was "to allow plaintiff to acquire a 
pollution control system and any services were incidental to that 
primary purpose"). 
Palmer and Interwest, moreover, are "merchants." Palmer's 
assertion that it "has never held itself out as a fiberglass tank 
manufacturer" (Pal. Br. 46) is beside the point. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 70A-2-104(l) provides that one becomes a merchant, not only by 
"hold[ing] himself out as having knowledge or skill," but also by 
employing an "intermediary who by his occupation holds himself out 
as having such knowledge or skill." As the leading hornbook on the 
Uniform Commercial Code explains: 
The first phrase captures the jeweler, the hardware store 
20 
owner, the haberdasher, and others selling from 
inventory. The second description, having to do with 
occupation, knowledge, and skill, includes electricians, 
plumbers, carpenters, boat builders, and the like. . . . 
[A] "bank" or "even universities" through their agents 
can have the necessary knowledge or skill to make them 
merchants. 
White & Summers, Uniform Commercial Code § 9.6, at 345 (2d ed. 
1984) (emphasis added) (citing Frantz, Inc. v. Blue Grass Hams, 
Inc., 520 S.W.2d 313 (Ky. 1974) (mechanical contracting firm held 
"merchant" with respect to cooling equipment it installed)). 
Accordingly, the "merchant" status of the tank manufacturer is 
imputed to Palmer and Interwest and the UCC implied warranties 
apply. 
C. Palmer and Interwest Are Strictly Liable for Their 
Defective Performances 
The appellees, finally, assert that they are not liable under 
Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Palmer asserts 
that strict liability does not apply to transactions involving 
"sophisticated" parties (Pal. Br. 44-46), while Interwest asserts 
that strict liability does not apply to construction contracts. 
Int. Br. 17-18. Neither claim is meritorious. 
Palmer's "sophisticated party" exception to strict liability 
is based on the much-criticized decision in Scandinavian Airlines 
System v. United Aircraft Corp., 601 F.2d 425 (9th Cir. 1979). In 
Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement & Power District v. 
Westinghouse Electric Corp., 694 P.2d 198 (Ariz. 1984), the Arizona 
See also Schneider v. Suhrmann, 327 P.2d 822, 824 (Utah 
1958) (implying warranties of merchantability and fitness for 
intended purpose even without the UCC; "the supplier is deemed to 
warrant the product to be reasonably safe and suitable for the 
use for which it is intended"). 
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Supreme Court noted that, while "the need for risk distribution and 
compensation" is less compelling when "sophisticated" parties are 
involved (694 P.2d at 211; cf. Pal. Br. 45-46 (making identical 
argument)), that is an insufficient ground for limiting strict 
liability to "fordinary consumers.1" 694 P.2d at 211 (citing 
Scandinavian Airlines). 
[T]he doctrine of strict liability has additional 
objectives [beyond risk distribution and compensation]. 
Foremost among these is the promotion of safety. The 
doctrine of strict tort liability provides manufacturers 
a strong incentive to design, manufacture and distribute 
safe products . . . . That goal of tort law is best 
served when those who distribute products are held 
strictly liable for damage resulting from products which 
contain unreasonably dangerous defects, which cause 
"accidents" endangering life or property, and which 
actually damage persons or property. 
* * * * 
Other factors militate in favor of a uniform rule which 
applies to all consumers. Immunity, including the 
limited immunity from claims by certain classes of 
claimants, does not promote adherence to the standards of 
care imposed by the law. . . . We do not limit the 
availability of § 402A recovery to "ordinary consumers" 
but recognize its viability for all who can meet its 
proof requirements. This court does not favor 
distinctions based upon the class or size of the parties 
before it. The applicability of a tort theory depends 
not upon the size of the plaintiff, but upon the nature 
of the claim. The very attempt to distinguish tort 
rights on the basis of economic strength would raise 
collateral issues which we deem irrelevant. An actor has 
no more privilege to inflict injury on the wealthy than 
on the poor. The same rules apply to all, plaintiff or 
defendant, large or small. 
Salt River Project, 694 P.2d at 211-12 (citations omitted); accord 
Icelandic Airlines, Inc. v. Canadair, Ltd., 428 N.Y.S.2d 393, 399 
(Sup. Ct. 1980). 
Interwest's assertion that strict liability does not apply to 
construction projects is no more persuasive. Even assuming, as 
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Interwest argues (Int. Br. 17-18), that contractors should not be 
held strictly liable for the erection of an "unreasonably 
dangerous" building, that is not the basis for Thiokol1s claim. 
Thiokol is simply asserting that Palmer and Interwest are liable 
for their provision of dangerously defective goods — i.e., the 
"under-designed" tanks. App. A at 6. And, whatever the vagaries 
of strict liability theory as applied to "general contractors of 
large commercial buildings" (Pal. Br. 18), it is absolutely clear 
that the suppliers of dangerously defective products used in a 
construction project are strictly liable. Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. 
Armco Steel Co., 601 P.2d 152 (Utah 1979) (supplier of defective 
steel beam used in construction of mall strictly liable for damages 
flowing from mall's collapse). 
Thiokolfs tort, UCC and strict liability theories are well-
grounded in law and were improperly disregarded by the trial court. 
This Court, therefore, must reverse and remand Thiokol's 
alternative theories for trial. 
IV. PALMER AND INTERWEST HAVE DISTORTED THE RECORD TO DEFLECT 
THE COURT FROM THE LEGAL QUESTIONS RAISED BY THIS CASE 
Because established law does not support the trial court's 
decision, appellees strenuously submit that Thiokol has disregarded 
the court's factual findings (Pal. Br. 8), failed to "marshall" the 
evidence" (Pal. Br. 20-23; Int. Br. 6), and not recited the 
evidence in the light "most favorable" to them. Pal. Br. 23. 
These issues do not loom large because, however one construes the 
record, the trial court's unprecedented use of comparative fault 
(see supra Part I), its disregard of the law of "waiver" and 
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"modification" (see supra Part II) and its refusal to decide well-
founded tort theories (see supra Part III) require reversal. 
Appellees' "factual" assertions, in any event, are devoid of merit. 
Thiokol has not "disregarded" the Findings of Fact (Pal. Br. 
8), it has simply given them the same weight the trial court did. 
The memorandum decision was written by the court; the Findings of 
Fact by Palmer. Accordingly, the trial court itself discounted 
their importance. In post-trial arguments regarding the accuracy 
of the "findings," the lower court stated that "[w]hen you folks 
are arguing before the Court of Appeals on this thing you've [sic, 
you're] going to have the memorandum decision analyzed, torn apart, 
dissected. It's a bigger part of your arguments than the formal 
findings are." Tr. 2481-82. Thiokol, therefore, has merely relied 
on findings actually made by the trial court (i.e., the memorandum 
decision, App. A) rather than Palmer's post-hoc characterizations. 
That reliance upon the trial court's memorandum rather than 
Palmer's "findings" is appropriate becomes clear when the merits of 
Palmer's "marshalling" and "favorable light" arguments are 
examined. Contrary to Palmer's assertion (at 8), Thiokol's opening 
brief fairly and succinctly summarizes all of the arguments made by 
Palmer and Interwest, as well as all of the evidence in support of 
those arguments. Compare Pal. Br. 8-19 with Thiokol Br. 2-13, 13-
19; State v. Harrison, 783 P.2d 565, 566 n.l (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Indeed, the only "additions" supplied by Palmer are outright 
distortions and patent mischaracterizations. 
Because correction of the appellees' factual misstatements 
requires the citation of fairly lengthy excerpts from the 
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transcript, and because these factual matters are not (in any 
event) determinative of this case, Thiokol's response is set out in 
the Addendum to this Reply Brief. Thiokol hesitates to correct the 
"facts"; even Thiokol's limited response in the Addendum lends 
credence to the appellees' claim that this is a "clearly erroneous" 
case. E.g., Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). It is not. See supra Parts I, 
II & III. Many of the "factual" assertions in Palmer's brief, 
however, are too outrageous to pass without comment — as a brief 
perusal of the Addendum will demonstrate. 
Moreover, the Addendum — at the very least — deflates 
Palmer's claim that the recitation of the evidence in Thiokol's 
brief does not adequately "favor" appellees. Pal. Br. 23. Palmer 
is entitled to all reasonable inferences from the record. It is 
not entitled to distort the record in any manner it sees fit. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the trial court should be reversed and the 
case remanded for determination of Thiokol's damages incurred as a 
result of Interwest's, Palmer's and Rysgaard's breach of contract, 
breach of express and implied warranties, negligence and provision 
of unreasonably dangerous tanks. 
Respectfjjj^ly submitted, 
Mary Anne d. Wood 
Richard G/Wilkins 
Anthony B.^Quinn 
WOOD, SPENDLOVE & QUINN 
Counsel For Appellant 
Thiokol Corporation 
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Addenda 
ADDENDUM 
The briefs filed by Palmer and Interwest submit as "facts" 
numerous items that are either not supported — or directly 
contradicted by — the record. In each numbered paragraph below, 
Thiokol sets out a "factual" assertion made by appellees. Thiokol 
then reproduces the actual testimony from the transcript revealing 
the appellees' mischaracterization. To avoid the charge that it is 
merely "rearguing" its case (cf. Pal. Br. 22-23), Thiokol (to the 
maximum extent possible) will allow the transcript to speak for 
itself. However, because of the technical nature of the issues 
involved, some textual explanation is necessary to make the 
transcript comprehensible. 
1. Pal. Br. 4: "Expert witnesses testified that had the 
tanks been used as contemplated by the plans and 
specifications, the tanks as manufactured would have been 
serviceable (Tr 2132-33)." 
The foregoing is an outright misrepresentation of the cited 
testimony. At the cited pages of the transcript, Paul Tullis (a 
research scientist with Utah State University, Tr. 2101), testified 
— not that tank T33 had been improperly "used" — but that the 
tank was not built to even a safety factor of three (let alone the 
safety factor of ten required by NBS PS15-69 and industry 
standards). According to Tullis, completely overfilling the tanks 
would increase the water level by 7 inches, which in turn would 
increase pressure in the tanks by 3.36%. As a result, completely 
overfilling the tanks would only take 1/100th of the safety factor 
for a tank designed to a safety factor of three and the tank (even 
if it had been only one-third as strong as specified by NBS PS15-
A-l 
69) would not have failed. 
Tr. 2132-33 (cross examination): 
Q. Let me ask this: assuming that all the tests done on 
the side walls of these tanks indicate that the 
tanks were probably strong enough to withstand three 
times the hoop stresses at the bottom of the tank, 
three times ultimate, can you account for in any 
fashion any additional pressures or additional 
stresses or additional something on this tank which 
would overcome that three times the ultimate hoop 
stress which has been measured? 
A. No. I couldn't find any way of getting anything more 
than about seven inches [of overfilling], which is 
one point — well, three percent. 
Q. 3.3 6 percent? 
A. A safety factor of three means 300 percent. We're 
taking three percent [because of the overfilling] so 
we're taking 100th of the safety factor. 
Q. And that 3.3 percent you've calculated into, say, 
any rise, if there were one, for three inches in an 
open area in the center of the lid? 
A. Well, the three percent is seven inches of rise [in 
water level]. 
Q. Seven inches of rise? 
A. Spilling out of the manway. 
On the very next page, Tullis (still under cross examination) 
gave his frank opinion as to why tank T33 failed. According to 
Tullis, the tank failed because it was weak. 
Tr. 2134 (cross examination) (emphasis added): 
Q. So assuming that there is three times — assuming 
the strength of the side wall is three times that of 
the hoop stresses at the bottom of the tank, even if 
completely full you can't account for or understand 
how this tank failed, can you? 
A. I wasn't asked to address why it failed. I was only 
asked to address were there any hydraulic forces 
fi.e., overfilling] sufficient to cause failure, and 
my answer would be no. 
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Q. From a hydraulic standpoint you canft see what 
additional forces would have caused it to fail 
because you can only account for 3.36 percent 
additional forces? 
A. Right. My calculation — my conclusion would be 
that it did not fail because of excessive force 
fi.e., overfilling], it failed because of weakness 
of the tank. It could not take the normal force 
that was on the tank. 
The testimony cited in Palmer's brief, in short, does not 
establish that the tanks would have been "serviceable" if "used as 
contemplated by the plans and specifications" (Pal. Br. 4), but 
rather that the tanks would have been serviceable if they had been 
built as contemplated by the plans and specifications. The tanks, 
however, were not so built. Indeed, Palmer's own expert witnesses 
agreed that (contrary to Palmer's current position, Pal. Br. 40-42) 
the original plans and specifications for the tanks were not 
unusual and — if followed — would have resulted in perfectly safe 
tanks. 
Tr. 1646-47 (George Fisher, Palmer's fiberglass expert) (cross 
examination): 
Q. Now, the specifications, and I think its been 
referred to as Exhibit 183, for the tanks, they 
aren't unusual in the industry, wouldn't you say 
that's true. 
A. That's correct. 
Q. You've seen specifications like that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you've produced perfectly adequate, serviceable 
product as a result of those kinds of specifications? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. In fact, you bid on this project, didn't you? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. And you weren't the successful bidder, but you bid on 
these very specifications? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you seek any clarifications? 
A. No. 
Q. You understood what was contemplated by these 
specifications, didn't you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you would have produced tanks that didn't fail after 
two months if you had been the one selected? 
Mr. Daubney: Objection. Calls for a conclusion, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: I'm going to allow it, though. I think he's in 
a position to so testify. 
THE WITNESS: Absolutely. 
See also Tr. 1898 (testimony of Brent Thomas, Palmerfs expert 
witness) (witness responds "That's correct" to the question whether 
he could have used Thiokol's original plans and specifications to 
design and build "perfectly serviceable tanks"). 
2. Pal. Br. 13: "Dr. Tullis, Thiokol's hydraulic's 
expert, testified that if the side-walls of the 
tanks were three times as strong as the 
expected hoop stress of 3.000 psi, he could not 
account for the failure (Tr 2132-33). The 
side-walls were that strong." 
The above characterization of the transcript is simply wrong. 
The testimony from Tr. 2132-33 is set out under paragraph no. 1, 
above. As a review of that testimony indicates, Dr. Tullis did not 
testify that he "could not account for the failure." Pal. Br. 13. 
Rather, Dr. Tullis testified that — if, as Palmer asserts (Pal. 
Br. 13), the side-walls of the tanks had at least a safety factor 
of three — then completely overfilling the tank would not have 
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resulted in its rupture. See Testimony from Tr. 2132-33 (under 
f 1, above). Thus, rather than showing that Tullis "could not 
account for the failure" (Pal. Br. 13), the testimony on pages 
2132-33 supports Tullis' ultimate conclusion that the tank "did not 
fail because of excessive force, it failed because of weakness of 
the tank." Tr. 2134. 
3. Pal. Br. 19: "Dr. Glasso Tsic] stated that the failure 
was not inconsistent with upward pressure (Tr 357-58)." 
The trial court found that tank T33 failed as a result of 
overfilling, which put upward pressure on the tank causing it to 
burst. App. A at 5. As set out in Thiokol's Brief (at 18-19), 
this "upward pressure" theory was not supported by any evidence, 
expert or otherwise, except for self-serving statements by the tank 
manufacturer, John Rysgaard. E.g.f Tr. 1948-51. Palmer, 
therefore, is understandably hard-pressed to come up with something 
(anything?) to support the trial court's "failure by overfilling" 
conclusion. But, Palmer's bald-faced assertion that Dr. Galasso 
did not find the failure "inconsistent" with uplift (Pal. Br. 19) 
is astounding, because a straightforward reading of the transcript 
reveals that Dr. Galasso testified precisely to the contrary. 
Dr. Galasso testified that "[i]f something fails by uplift 
alone, then my experience is that the failure would be 
circumferential," rather than the vertical rupture experienced by 
T33. Tr. 357. And, when asked whether the failure of T33 was 
"inconsistent with that type of ri.e., an uplift] failure," Dr. 
Galasso succinctly replied, "[y]eah, it was, because in that kind 
of a failure ri.e., an uplift failure] there was no vertical 
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rupture." Tr. 358. The transcript excerpt follows. 
Tr. 357-58 (emphasis added): 
Q. . . . This failure that you've described, are there — is 
this inconsistent with a failure resulting from upward 
pressure on the tanks? 
A. Not usually, no. 
Q. Explain what you mean. 
A. Upward pressure on the tank — well, the main stress in 
this tank was hoop stress. The largest stress was stress 
in the tangential direction, hoop stress. In something 
that had some — in something that had a large — well, 
uplift, uplift is reflected as an axial stress, not a 
hoop stress. If something fails by uplift alone, then my 
experience is that the failure would be circumferential. 
As a matter of fact, that's driven home because the first 
field tank I ever fixed was a field repair of a 30-foot 
tank in Bellingham, Washington that ruptured due to over 
pressure uplift and was not well held down. The tank 
bottom ruptured and it ruptured around almost 270 
degrees. That tank was filled with acid and it ate the 
corporate — ate the carport off a corporate headquarters 
of a major pulp mill and was quite a hot potato for about 
a year. I came to work there and my new boss said I have 
this little project for you. 
Q. Was this failure inconsistent with that type of failure 
fi.e.. uplift failure]? 
A. Yeah, it was, because in that kind of a failure there was 
no vertical rupture. There was a circumferential 
failure. 
See also Tr. 3 60-62 (Galasso summarizes numerous reasons why "this 
rupture was inconsistent with a rupture based upon an uplift 
pressure"). 
4. Pal. Br. 12: "Glasso fsic] admitted that the 
specifications don't state a safety factor (Tr 417), 
nor strength requirements for woven roving (Tr 
418)." 
Dr. Galasso did not give the above testimony. On the 
contrary, he testified that Thiokol's specifications required 
adherence to NBS PS15-69, and merely stated that he could not 
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remember whether NBS PS15-69 required a particular strength of 
woven roving. Tr. 417-18. And, somewhat later in his testimony, 
Dr. Galasso stressed that NBS PS15-69 establishes a safety factor 
of ten. Tr. 438, 446-47. The transcript excerpts follow. 
Tr. 417-18 (cross examination) (emphasis added): 
Q. And you've seen the plans and specifications that Thiokol 
prepared for submission on these tanks, have you not? 
A. Uh-huh, as part of a much larger project. 
Q. What does it say in there about the safety factor? 
A. That I can remember it doesn't say anything about the 
safety factor. It specifies or gives a specification 
which itself is an industry standard, or implies an 
industry standard safety factor. 
Q. The specification you're talking about is the PS 15-69? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And is there anything in the specifications that says the 
wall thickness? 
A. I can't remember in this specification whether there is. 
15-69 gives a minimum wall thickness of one-eighth. 
Q. I'm talking, sir, about specific specifications. 
A. I can't remember if this specification states a minimum 
thickness. 
Q. Is there anything about the type or width or strength of 
the woven roving? 
A. Not specifically mentioned in — not that I remember that 
is specifically mentioned in the specifications. 
Tr. 438 (cross examination) (emphasis added): 
Q. . . . If we want a safety factor of ten then we say in 
the specifications we want a safety factor of ten, isn't 
that true? 
A. Well, no. Another way to put it is to say I want to 
abide by a specification which has an applicable part 
saying that I want a safety factor of ten. 
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Tr. 446-47 (cross examination) (emphasis added): 
Q. . . . Where does it say in this entire document [i.e., 
NBS PS15-69], sir, that you have to have a safety factor 
of ten? 
A. It's implied by the footnote. 
Q. Don't tell me what's implied, tell me where it says it. 
A. If it doesn't say it it does give me guidance and the 
only thing I can do as a prudent designer is to go by the 
guidance given me in the specification, no matter where I 
see it. In this case I see it in the footnote. 
Q. When it says based on a safety factor of ten to one, 
doesn't that imply that other safety factors might be 
used? 
A. No, it does not. 
Q. But does this say that this is a minimum safety factor or 
a mandatory one? 
A. No. It just says — this says it is based — the design 
intent is a safety factor of ten. If I choose to 
overdesign it, fine, I'm sure nobody would worry about 
that. If I choose to underdesign it, I think I'm 
conflicting with the intent of the specification. 
5. Pal. Br. 5: "Sometime after June 18, 1989, Thiokol . . . 
modified the tanks from gravity fill, as designed and 
specified, to pressure fill (Tr. 147, 2083, 1285, 1304)." 
Int. Br. 3: "The tanks were changed from a gravity 
fill to a pressure fill system . . . [citing same 
transcript pages noted by Palmer]. 
There is absolutely no evidence that Thiokol's addition of 
pumps resulted in "pressure fill." The "pressure fill" contention 
was the centerpiece of Palmer's "attenuation" argument. See 
Thiokol Br. 17-18 & n.ll. Palmer's experts, however, admitted that 
— if the pipe filling the tank had "open channel flow" (i.e., air 
space inside the pipe) — "attenuation" would not occur and could 
have no impact on the tank. Tr. 1369-72, 1393, 1431, 1436. 
Palmer's experts also conceded that "open channel flow" results in 
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"gravity flow." Tr. 1372. The evidence was undisputed that the 
pipes filling the tanks would always have "open channel flow" (Tr. 
2116-17), resulting in "gravity flow" — not "pressure" — filling 
of the tanks. Tr. 2119, 2123. 
Indeed, the evidence on this issue was so clear that the trial 
court rejected Palmer's contention that Thiokol had modified the 
tanks to "pressure fill." The court concluded (App. A at 5) 
(emphasis added): 
Much also has been said relative to the change in the 
method of filling the tanks from gravity feed to overhead 
feed. Though that is a substantial change which in and 
of itself may void any warranties given, the Court is not 
persuaded that that change without more resulted in the 
failure. The evidence of vibration or trauma to the 
tanks from the overhead filling was, to this Court, 
insufficiently persuasive to indicate that it was a 
causative factor. 
6. Pal. Br. 13: "Dr. Glasso [sic, Galasso], 
Thiokol's main expert, admitted he could not 
determine what caused the failure (Tr 
448). . . . He was, at most 'suspicious1 that 
the lack of sufficient overlap may have caused 
the problem, but could not state any cause with 
reasonable probability (Tr 356)." 
The above is an intentionally misleading summary of the 
testimony given by Dr. Maurice Galasso, an independent consulting 
engineer specializing in commercial fiberglass design. Tr. 319. 
Review of the transcript at pages 356 and 448-49 reveals that Dr. 
Galasso was, indeed, "suspicious" that the tank failed at an 
overlap of the woving roving because the rupture exposed straight, 
uncut edges of the fabric. But, far from being unable to 
"determine what caused the failure" (Pal. Br. 13), Galasso — in 
response to questions from the trial court — gave his best 
professional opinion that the failure was caused by insufficient 
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overlapping of the woven roving. Dr. Galasso's actual testimony, 
from pages 355-56 and 448-49 of the transcript, follows. 
Tr. 355-56 (emphasis added): 
Q. You talked about the weakness at an overlap. Are there 
any indications from the photographs that indeed this 
failure did occur where the woven roving did not have 
sufficient overlap? 
A. Yes, I think so. 
Q. Can you identify those points in the photographs? 
A. Okay. 
MR. KELLY: This is Exhibit 323 the witness is referring 
to. [Exh. 323 is included in Appendix K to 
Thiokol's Brief.] 
THE WITNESS: Okay. This is fairly high up on the tank wall, 
but I believe — I can't see what goes on in here, but I 
can see here and what basically you see here, whenever I 
see anything like that, a very sharp edge with very 
little taper to it, the first thing I will look for is 
very little overlap, because typically you don't get — a 
failure does not look that sharp. That's almost — its 
very suspicious that the failure occurred in the resin in 
something like that. 
Most failures show, you know, a failure path which is not 
— does not have the ends of the roving showing like 
that. It may pull out all right, but you have different 
length rovings. That can be shown, though we don't have 
one here, but if you look on test samples you'll see that 
behavior. These things basically usually do not break 
right across the sample. They break rather irregularly. 
The only time they really want to break right across the 
sample is if they have a preferred path of breaking, but 
that sort of thing makes me very suspicious, although I 
can't look at that. If I could look at that and put that 
back together I could give you a better opinion, but any 
time I see something like that I'm very suspicious that 
there was — I'm very suspicious about the overlap. 
That's the first thing I will look at. 
Tr. 448-49 (emphasis added): 
THE COURT: You told us . . . how this thing broke or 
failed? 
THE WITNESS: My idea of it, yeah. 
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THE COURT: But you haven't been able to specify exactly 
why it broke, have you? 
THE WITNESS: No. 
THE COURT: You simply don't know? 
THE WITNESS: It is my best opinion based on what I can see 
and what information has been given to me. 
THE COURT: In other words, it is your opinion that 
somewhere on that tank there was a place where 
the tensile strength was not above the pounds 
per square inch applied, correct? 
THE WITNESS: Someplace that would not sustain that stress 
and it ruptured, it locally ruptured. 
7. Pal. Br. 6-7: "The operation of the pumps 
created an uplifting force of approximately 
17,000 pounds (Tr. 2136-38, 604-05)," 
Pal. Br. 19: "Dr. Paul Tullis, Thiokol's 
hydraulic expert, testified that overfilling 
the tanks would cause an uplifting force 
between 7,000 and 28,000 pounds (Tr. 2136, 
2138)." 
Palmer makes the above assertions to support its claim that 
the tanks were "neither designed nor built" to sustain the claimed 
uplift force. Pal. Br. 7. The cited transcript pages, however, 
provide no support for the asserted "28,000 pounds" of pressure. 
The transcript, instead, reveals that (at most) overfilling the 
tanks would produce between 6,000 and 16,000 pounds of uplift. Tr. 
2136 (6,000 to 7,000 pounds); Tr. 2137 (15,000 to 16,000 pounds); 
Tr. 605 (11,000 pounds). 
That uplift, moreover, would only "increase[] the stress [on 
the tank] three percent" (Tr. 2138) — an increase well within the 
design parameters of the tanks, even assuming they had a safety 
factor of three rather than ten. Tr. 605 (noting that the uplift 
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created by completely overfilling the tank "would not be enough to 
cause any significant increase in the stress on the tank walls to 
be of any concern"). See also Tr. 3233 (a 3% increase in stress on 
the tanks would take "100th of the safety factor" of three). 
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